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HISTORY IS NOT ENOUGH: USING
CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS IN INTERPRETING
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Abstract: Over two hundred years after James Madison wrote the
Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, there is still little agree-
ment on the meaning of "the right of the people to keep and bear
arms." The debate over this provision has focused on divining the intent
of the Framers to determine what was meant by the "militia" in the
eighteenth century. Interpreting the past, however, has failed to resolve
the issue, evidenced by the fact that both those in favor of and those
opposed to a private right to keep and bear arms point to the same
authorities for support. This Note argues that rather than continually
re-examining historical sources, we should determine whether there are
contemporary justifications supporting the individual right of a citizen
to keep and bear arms.
INTRODUCTION
Of all of the provisions in the U.S. Constitution, few seem to
spark as much debate as the Second Amendment) More than two
hundred years after the drafting of the Constitution, the United States
is still arguing over why the Framers granted the people the right to
keep and bear arms. 2 There are essentially two main sides in this de-
bates The first is the collective or states' right view, which is that the
Sec U.S. CONS'''. amend. II; Don B. Kates, Jr„ Handgun Prohibition and the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Micit. L. REV. 204, 206 (1983); Donna-Marie Korth &
Candace Reid Gladston, The Second Amendment Was Not Intended to fustib Arming Every Tom,
Dick and Harriet with an Assault Weapon, 17 Sr. jont-t's J. LEGAL COMMENT, 515, 515-17
(2003); Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrasSing Second Amendment, 99 YALE, L.J. 637, 641
(1989); William McCoskey, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms Shall Not Be Litigated
Away: Constitutional Implications of Municipal Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 77 [NI).
873, 873-74 (2002); John Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment and tlw Failure of
Originalism, 40 BRANDEts Li. 659, 660-61 (2002).
2 Sec U.S. CONS'''. amend. H; Kates, supra note 1, at 206; Korth & Gladston, supra note
1, at 515-17; Levinson, supra note 1, at 641; McCoskey, supra note 1, at 873-74; Prince,
supra note I, at 660-61.
3 Kates, SUM note 1, at 206.
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Second Amendment only protects the right of the states to maintain a
militia and not the right of individual citizens to keep and bear arms, 4
Proponents of this view claim that the Second Amendment only per-
mits individuals to bear firearms collectively; when they are part of a
state organized military unit .° This is the current position of the
American Civil Liberties Union and many legal academics.°
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the view endorsed by the
National Rifle Association and other pro-gull ownership groups, which
is that the Second Amendment does protect the right of individual citi-
zens to keep and bear arms.? Although acknowledging that this right
exists partly to provide for a militia, this view also allows for citizens to
be armed to protect themselves and to serve as a check against tyranny.°
To a startling degree, both sides cite the same case law, history, and,
other authorities to support their views .° The difference is in interpre-
tation, with each group giving varying degrees of importance to differ-
ent Framers of the Constitution and judicial opinions.'° The result is
that the debate between the two sides has fallen into a never-ending
circle of simply re-interpreting those same authorities." For example,
James Madison's intentions are constantly re-examined in an effort to
show that he supported either an individual or a states' right view when
he wrote the Second Amendment. 12 Aside from pointing to the current.
societal costs or benefits of firearms (depending on one's point of view)
there has been little new material injected into this debate."
4 Levinson, supra note 1, at 644.
5 Id. at 642,644.
6 Id.
7 Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain Mean-
ing of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. Rev. 127,161 (2003).
8 See Kates, supra note 1, at 267-68.
9
 Compare Lasson, supra note 7, at 133, with Levinson, supra note 1, at 647-49 (using
exactly the same quote from James Madison in both arguments).
10 Compare Lasson, supra note 7, at 187, with Levinson, supra note 1, at 652-55 (reach-
ing different conclusions on United Stales u Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).
" See, e.g., Kates, supra note 1, at 248-49; Lasson, supra note 7, at 140-41.
12
 See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 7, at 133; Levinson, supra note 1, at 647-49.
13 See Kates, supra note 1, at 268-70; Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 521-22; Lasson,
supra note 7, at 127. The two sides of the debate hold different opinions on the value of
firearms in society, both at the time of the training of the U.S. Constitution and in the
present. Kates, supra note 1, at 268-69; Korth S: Gladston, supra note 1, at 516. They also
articulate very different accounts of American history—one claiming that firearms were
valued and relied on to protect home and country, and the other maintaining that few
knew how to use firearms because such weapons had little practical importance. See Kates,
supra note 1, at 214-16; Lasson, supra note 7, at 131.
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The federal courts also are divided on this issue." In 1939, in
United States v. Millet; the U.S. Supreme Court undertook its most re-
cent examination of which right the Second Amendment protects. 16
Unfortunately, that decision is not entirely clear, and both states' right.
supporters and individual right advocates read the case as supporting
their position. 16 Not surprisingly, perhaps, a split. has developed
among the federal circuit courts of appeals, with most finding a states'
right, but with the Fifth Circuit. Court. of Appeals finding an individual
right to bear arms. 17
It will take a specific ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court to
finally resolve the meaning of the Second Amenchnent. 18 With so
much confusion about the intent of the Framers and other historical
factors, however, the Court. will need to look elsewhere to determine
which right the Second Amendment. protects. 19 This Note argues that.
the question should be decided by looking at how state legislatures
and courts currently define the right to bear arms. 20
Looking to present justifications to interpret an older piece of
legislation is a method the Supreme Court has used in the past, such
as in the interpretation of state blue laws.21 In 1961, in Gallagher v.
Crown. Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., the Court upheld blue
laws—restrictions on Sunday activities based in religion—by noting
that state legislatures currently justify them as providing a clay of rest
for workers. 22 According to the Court, although the original reasons
for enacting blue laws might have violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment by promoting religion, a new justification
14 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 220, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that al-
though it had found an individual right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, the other
federal circuit courts of appeals had not).
15 307 U.S. at 175.
16 Compare Kates, supra note 1, at 249 (interpreting the Court to have ruled in favor of
an individual right), with Lasson, supra note 7, at 140 (reading the case in favor of a states'
right).
17 See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 220, 260.
18 See Kates, supra note 1, at 248-50 (stating that Miller has caused much confusion).
19 See Lasson, supra note 7, at 156. Lasson stresses that the U.S. Constitution was in-
tended to be a living, flexible document that can adapt to meet the needs of the present.
Id. Because history has not provided an answer, it seems that the U.S. Supreme Court
should take this approach in deciding the meaning of the Second Amendment to deter-
mine if an individual right to bear arms makes sense in today's world. Sec id.
2° See infra notes 299-357 and accompanying text.
21 See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 626-27
(1961) (describing how the purpose of the blue laws has changed over time).
22 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 598 (1961); Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 627.
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had evolved over time. 23
 Providing a day of rest, regardless of the
original intent of the blue laws, was an adequate justification for up-
holding these statutes in modern times. 24
 Further, any reference to
religion that these statutes still contained should be read as a relic of
the past and as no longer controlling the purpose of the statute. 25
The same reasoning used to find a modern justification for the
blue laws can be used to support an individual right to bear arms. 2°
The analogy to the Second Amendment is that regardless of whether
the Framers originally granted the right to bear arms to provide for a
militia, other reasons now exist for upholding this as an individual
right. 27
 Evidence of how the right to bear arms is viewed and justified
as an individual right is found in state constitutions, an important
source for determining how Americans have defined the rights they
believe they should have. 28
 The majority of state constitutions ex-
pressly grant an individual right to bear arms. 29
 Most of these state
constitutions provide reasons for doing so, the most common reason
being self-defense." Numerous state courts have upheld the right of
citizens to defend themselves, and the structure of American tort law
demonstrates a need for this right.31
With this evidence for how most states grant and justify an indi-
vidual right to bear arms, courts should find that the contemporary
reason for the Second Amendment is to protect an individual right of
citizens to keep and bear arms. 32
 Like the blue laws, the U.S. Constitu-
tion is a piece of legislation, and the meaning behind its provisions
should be able to evolve in a similar manner." The Second Amend-
ment's reference to the militia, like the mention of religion in the
blue laws, should be read as outdated and as no longer defining why
the right to bear arms exists. 34
23 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445; Mc Gip:icy, 366 U.S. at 593, 596-98; Gallagher; 366 U.S. at
626-28.
25 Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 626-27.
26 See infra notes 282-357 and accompanying text.
27
 Sec infra notes 282-357 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 155-180 and accompanying text.
29 itifta note 155 and accompanying text.
5° See infra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
31
 See infra notes 185-281 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 282-357 and accompanying text.
33
 See Lasson, supra note 7, at 156.
54
 See Gallagher; 366 U.S. at 626-27.
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Part I of this Note reviews how the federal courts have dealt with
the Second Amendment.35 Part II reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's
treatment of the blue laws and the idea that the justification for a
piece of legislation can change over time. 35 Part III examines the
justifications for an individual right to bear arms today, by looking at
state constitutions, state court decisions, and the logic used in Ameri-
can tort law.37 Part IV points out that recognizing an individual right
to bear arms is not a surrender to lawlessness because this right, like
all others, can be regulated in reasonable ways. 35 Part V argues that
even if the Second Amendment was originally concerned with the mi-
litia, the reasons for a right to bear arms have changed over time, and
the Second Amendment should now be read as protecting an individ-
ual right to bear arms. 39
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT BY
THE FEDERAL COURTS
The U.S. Supreme Court has not examined the Second Amend-
ment since 1939, and its last holding on which right. the Second
Amendment. protects was unclear. 40 This lack of a clear ruling has be-
come one of the reasons behind the current split among the federal
circuit courts of appeals.'" The majority of lower federal courts have
ruled that the Second Amendment only protects the right of the states
to maintain a militia.42 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
after a lengthy historical analysis, has found that the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, making it
likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will need to revisit the issue. 43
A. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Miller
The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly outlined its position on
which right the Second Amendment protects." In 1939, in United
35 Sec infra notes 40-81 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 82-130 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 131-281 and accompanying text.
34 Sec infra notes 282-298 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 299-357 and accompanying text.
4() See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,175 (1939).
41 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,220 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Oakes,
564 F.2(1 384,387 (10th Cir. 1977).
42 Lasson, supra note 7, at 139.
43 See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264.
44 See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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States v Miller; the Court gave the latest of only three decisions on this
issue.45 The case concerned the sale of a sawed-off shotgun in viola-
tion of the National Firearms Act. 45 The Court ruled that the Second
Amendment did not protect possession of this weapon because a
shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches long serves no mili-
tary purpose and is not related to maintaining a militia.47
The Court did not answer clearly the question about a collective
versus an individual right.48 The opinion states that the purpose of the
Second Amendment was to preserve the militia, which could support
the states' right theory of the Second Amendment. 43 The Court went
on to observe, however, that history showed that the nation's militia
consisted of all able-bodied males, which could support an individual
right argument. 5° For example, if all males are part of the militia, this
decision could be read to mean that every male citizen has ihe right
to possess a weapon that serves a military purpose. 51 It is possible that
if the defendants had possessed a weapon with military value, they
might have had a sound argument with the Court. 52
B. The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals: An Example of the
Futility of Looking to History
Until recently, the federal circuit courts of appeals had taken the
states' right view unanimously.53 For example, in 1977, in United States
v. Oakes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Second
Amendment does not protect the right of every citizen to possess a
weapon.54 Further, the court found that even the defendant's mem-
bership in a militia did not give him a right to possess an unregistered
firearm with no connection to military service. 55
45 307 U.S. at 175.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 178,
48 See id. at 178-83 (discussing the militia, but never articulating exactly which right
there was for individuals to possess arms); Kates, supra note 1, at 249 (interpreting Miller in
favor of an individual right view); Lasson, supra note 7, at 140 (interpreting Miller in favor
of a states' right view).
49 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
50 Sec id. at 179.
51 Levinson, supra note 1, at 655.
52 Sec id. at 654.
53 Lasson, supra note 7, at 139 (stating that almost every United States court of appeals'
decision since 1939 has rejected the individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment).
54 564 F.2d at 387.
55 Id.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, when it upheld a munici-
pal ban on handguns, agreed with the conclusion of the Tenth Circuit
that there was no individual right to bear arms. 56 Although it did not
consider a Second Amendment argument, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals also has upheld a national ban on automatic weapons. 57
More recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that
without membership in a militia, the Second Amendment does not
protect an individual's possession of a firearm. 58
The consistency in upholding a states' right view broke clown,
however, in 2001, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, in
United States v. Emerson, that the Second Amendment does protect an
individual's right to possess a firearm.° Observing that no other fed-
eral circuit court of appeals has agreed with this holding, the Fifth
Circuit nevertheless found that both historical evidence and the plain
meaning of the text support an individual right to bear arms.°
The Emerson court read Miller narrowly, finding that the U.S. Su-
preme Court had decided only that possessing a shotgun with a barrel
less than eighteen inches long was not protected by the Second
Amendment.81 The Fifth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court
had not decided whether a citizen had the right to bear any weapons
when not in a state-organized militia.° The Supreme Court never
suggested that the basis for finding the defendants guilty of illegally
possessing a weapon was that they had not belonged to a militia.° In-
stead, the decision focused only on the type of weapon the defendants
had possessed.° 4
The Fifth Circuit next examined the Meaning of the words in the
Second Amendment itself.° It found that the "people" who are given
the right. to keep and bear arms cannot be read as meaning the
"states."" The word "people" in the Second Amendment must have the
same meaning as it does elsewhere in the U.S. Constitution, referring
58 SCCQUiliCi V. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261. 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
57 Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 1990).
58 United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992).
59 See 270 E3d at 269.
60 Id. at 259-60.
51 See id. at 224.
" Id.
83 Id.
64 Emetson, 270 F.3d at 224.
65 Id. at 227.
136 1d. at 227-28.
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to citizens and not to state governments. 67
 The court also found that
although the U.S. Constitution gives the federal and state governments
powers and authority, only the people have rights, and thus, the Second
Amendment conveys the right to keep and bear arms to citizens. 68
The Fifth Circuit also found that the preamble of the Second
Amendment—"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free state"--cannot be read as interfering with an individual's
right to bear arms.69
 The court held that this phrase cannot control
the plain meaning of the Second Amendment to grant a right to indi-
viduals." Further, even if the word "militia" were held to be control-
ling, it still would not take away any rights from individuals: 7 i Looking
to Millet; James Madison in The Federalist No. 46, and the Militia Act of
1792, the Fifth Circuit found that the "militia" in the Second
Amendment consists of the body of the people, not the state-
organized units of the National Guard."
The last factor the Fifth Circuit examined was the history of the
Second Amendment, which the court also found supported an indi-
vidual's right to keep and bear arms." The amount of material that
the court examined was exhaustive, and its analysis was much more
thorough than that of the other federal circuit courts of appeals. 74 In
every instance, strong evidence supported the idea that the Second
67 Id.
66
 Id. at 229.
69
 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 233: see U.S. CONST. amend. II.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 234-35.
72
 Id. at 234-36. The Fifth Circuit quoted The Federalist No. 46, in which James Madison
states that any attempt by Congress to use a standing army to threaten liberty would be
"opposed [by] a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands" and describes the '`advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over
the people of almost every other nation ...." Id. at 235 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46
( James Madison)). The modern militia act states that "the unorganized militia ... consists
of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval
Militia." 10 U.S.C. §311(b) (2000).
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236,
74
 Compare id. at 236-37, 241, 245, 255 (discussing the federalist and anti-federalist de-
bate over ratifying the U.S. Constitution, what the ratifying states wanted or suggested be
put in the U.S. Constitution regarding a citizen's right to be armed, the history of the
drafting of the Second Amendment, and nineteenth century commentary), with Hale, 978
F.2d at 1020 (containing a short historical analysis, which assumes that the Second
Amendment only provides for a militia), Farmer; 907 F.2d at 1042, 1045 (including no his-
torical analysis at all), and Quaid, 695 F.2d at 270 (providing a short examination of case
law and no historical background or analysis).
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Amenchnent was intended to protect the right of individual citizens to
possess firearms.75
Although some of those opposed to an individual right neverthe-
less admire the enormous amount of historical analysis in Emerson, it
will not finally resolve the nature of the right that the Second
Amendment protects. 76 As Emerson itself noted, no other federal cir-
cuit court of appeals has supported this view. 77 Additionally, many of
the opponents of an individual right believe that any justifications for
it are now obsolete. 78 With modern professional police forces, they
claim, citizens no longer need to defend themselves. 79 There is also
little or no risk of tyranny in a democracy that has matured as much as
the United States and, therefore, there is no need to possess weapons
to resist the government. 8° In response to the historical justifications
given in Emerson, the opponents of an individual right would say that
those factors are no longer relevant. or never existed in the first place. 81
II. AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD: THE REVIEW OF BLUE LAWS BY THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA THAT THE REASON FOR A
PIECE OF LEGISLATION CAN CHANGE OVER TIME
In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down three decisions
preserving state blue laws. 82 In each, the Court found that although
restrictions of activities on Sundays had their roots in religion, the
laws could be upheld because modern, non-religious reasons to sup-
port them had evolved over time.83 Among others, the secular interest
of the state in setting aside a day of rest for workers was held to be a
legitimate reason for allowing the laws to stand.'" In other words, the
Court found a contemporary justification to support laws that some
considered antiquated and obsolete. 85
7$ See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259-60,
76 Gil GiTtntmore, The Phages °filmy-lean Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 455, 459-60 (2003).
77 270 F.3d at 220.
78 See, e.g., Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 522; Lasson, supra note 7, at 155-56.
79 See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 7, at 156..
86 Id. at 156-57.
01 Sec Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 522; Lasson, supra note 7, at 151, 161.
0'2 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,.449 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 597 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt, of Mass.,
Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1961).
85 See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431, 444; McGinley, 366 U.S. at 593, 596-98; Gallagher, 366
U.S. at 624, 630.
84 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445.
85 See Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 627 (explaining that the purpose of the blue laws had
changed over time).
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A. A Day of Rest Replacing Religion as theJustification for Blue
Laws: McGowan V. Maryland
In 1961, in McGowan v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
viewed the indictment of seven store employees for selling merchan-
dise on Sunday, in violation of Maryland state law.a6
 The employees
argued that this prohibition violated the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of the separation of church and state, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.° The Court found that the
employees had suffered an economic injury (because of the fines they
paid), allegedly due to the imposition of the rules of Christianity
upon them.88
 The employees also claimed that these blue laws vio-
lated the Establishment Clause by setting aside Sunday as a day of rest
to increase attendance at religious servicesP
The Court began its discussion by conceding that religion was the
original motivation behind the blue laws." Statutes that mandated the
closing of business on Sundays had a long history in both the United
States and England.91
 From the time of the founding of the American
colonies until the Revolution, the law in place was that of Charles II,
which stated the following:
For the better observation and keeping holy the Lord's clay,
commonly called Sunday: be it enacted ... that no trades-
man, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatso-
ever, shall do or exercise any worldly labor or business or work of
their ordinary callings ... [or] show forth, or expose for sale
any wares, merchandise, fruit . 92
With this background, the American colonies were quick to pro-
hibit certain activities on Sundays. 93
 For instance, in 1650, Plymouth
86
 366 U.S. at 422-23. The employees had violated Mn. ANN. Coot; art. 27, § 521 (re-
pealed 1992). Id. Although many items, such as tobacco, milk, bread, and gasoline were
exempted from this prohibition, the items sold by the appellants, including floor wax, a
three ring binder, and staples, were not. Id.
67 Id. at 430.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 431.
99 Id.
91 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431. In 1237, Henry III prohibited the opening of markets on
Sundays, and further restrictions followed through the 1600s, including the prohibition of,
at various times, Sunday fairs in churchyards, all fairs and markets, bodily labor, anti vari-
ous sports. Id. at 431-32.
92 Id. at 432 (citing 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (Eng.)).
m Id. at 433.
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Colony banned labor, unnecessary work, sports, and the sale of alcohol
on Sundays. 94 Around the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
every American state had some sort of restriction on Sunday activities. 95
After reviewing this history of the blue laws, the Court in
McGowan, examined whether these laws had retained their religious
character. 96 The Court observed that as early as the 1700s, non-religious
justifications were used to restrict activity on Sundays. 97 For example, in
1788, an English statute regulating the work of chimney sweeps ex-
plained that the restrictions on Sundays both allowed time for relig-
ious affairs and limited the number of hours the chimney sweeps
could work.98 The same year, a New York statute used the words "first
day of the week commonly called Sunday," instead of the "Lord's
day."99 By 1885, Justice Field was able to' write the following:
Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not
from any right of the government to legislate for the promo-
tion of religious observanceS, but from its right to protect all
persons from the physical and moral debasement which
comes from uninterrupted labor.'°°
More recently; the non-religiOus reasons for banning work or other
activities on Sundays have become more prominent, mostly out of con-
cern that workers need a day of rest. 101 The justifications for allowing
this day off have become stronger, with health studies recommending
such a break to maintain employee productivity. 1 °2 Additionally, those
supporting these prohibitions no longer represent only religious insti-
tutions, but now include labor groups and trade associations. 103
94 Id, Massachusetts Bay Colony, Connecticut, and New Haven had similar prohibi-
tions, some enacted even earlier than Plythouth's. Id. Leaving no doubt that these restric-
tions were intended to promote religion, a similar Massachusetts Say Colony statute pro-
claimed that the prohibitions were "to the end the Sabbath may be celebrated in a relig-
ious manner." Id.
95 Id.
96 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433.
97 Id. at 433-34.
98 Id. at 434 (citing 28 Geo. 3, c. 48 (1788) (Eng.)).
99
 Id. (citing 2 LAWS OF N.Y. 1785-1788, at 680). Maryland made a similar change to its
laws the same year. Id.
10 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885).
101
 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 434.
102 Id. at 434-35 (citing MINISTRY Or MUNITIONS, HEALTH OF MUNITIONS WORKERS
COMM nTEE, REPORT ON SUNDAY LABOUR, Memorandum No. 1, at 5 (1915)).
102 Id. at 435 (stating that modern English restrictions on Sunday activities were sup-
ported by the National Federation of Grocers, the National Chamber of Trade, the
Draper's Chamber of Trade, and the National Union of Shop Assistants).
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Noting that almost every U.S. state had some form of Sunday
regulations in place in 1961, the Court in McGowan found that blue
laws had evolved over the centuries and were no longer solely for the
promotion of religion. 104 The modern focus on secular reasons con-
vinced the Court that current blue laws are justified now primarily by
secular reasons, rather than religious ones. 105 State governments had
directed their efforts to protect the health and well-being of their citi-
zens, and there was no longer any conflict with the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitittion. 106 The fact that these laws were based
on religion hundreds of years ago was no reason why they could not
be upheld by interpreting them to promote public welfare today. 1 °7
With these principles in mind, the Court went on to rule that the
Maryland blue laws, although originally based in religion, could be up-
held for secular reasons."8 Although the statutes still contained terms
like the "'Lord's day'" or — profan [big] the Lord's day,'" they were, in
fact, no longer concerned'with the promotion of religion.m The legis-
lative intent now was to provide a day of rest from work, during which
all members of society could spend time together as they wished)"
B. Further Evidence of a Change in the Justification. for the Blue Laws:
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v, McGinley
The same year, 1961, in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this position." The issue
in that case was whether a Pennsylvania statute that banned the sale of
many articles on Sundays violated constitutional protections of relig-
ious freedom)" The Court first noted that the Pennsylvania statute
also had a religious background.'" As in McGowan, however, the
1" Id. at 435, 444-45.
105 Id. at 444-45.
126
 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442, 444-45.
107 Id. at 445.
108 Id. at 446, 449-50.
1°2 Id. at 448-49 (quoting Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492 (repealed 1992)).
110 Id. at 450. The Court also found persuasive the large number of activities now ex-
cepted from the Sunday restrictions, apparently because this allowed so many non-religious
activities to take place. Id. at 448-49. The fact that Sunday was chosen did not invalidate
the statutes, as that clay had come to have significance as a day of rest for all people, re-
gardless of whether they observed religious services. Id. at 451-52.
111 366 U.S. at 582, 598.
112 Id. at 583-84.
119 Id. at 584.
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Court found that the statute's current purpose and effect were no
longer the promotion of religion)"
The religious background of this statute dated back hundreds of
years. 115 As early as 1848, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had ruled that these restrictions, on Sunday activities no longer had a
solely religious purpose." 8 Like :Maryland, Pennsylvania's purpose in
closing businesses on Sundays was to provide a day of rest for work-
ers. 117 Because the majority of the state's population was Christian, it
was natural that the day of rest was Sunday, and the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the statute as a civil regulation aimed at enforcing a pe-
riod of rest. 118
C. Upholding a Day of Rest as AdequateJustification for the Blue Laws,
Even When. They Still Cause Economic Harm: Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.
The last of the three blue laws cases handed down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1961 was Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of
Massachusetts, Inc." 9 This challenge to restrictions on Sunday activities
seemed the strongest because the Massachusetts statute prevented a
supermarket run by Orthodox Jews from opening for business on
Sundays. 120 As a result, the store had to close two clays during the
week: on Saturdays to observe the Jewish Sabbath and on Sundays to
comply with the blue laws. 121 Thus, the store was placed at a disadvan-
tage compared to others, which only had to close on Sundays. 122
The Supreme Court started by acknowledging that Massachu-
setts's blue laws had their origins in religion and that the religious
114 Id. at 598.
115 Id. at 592-93. A colonial statute had been enacted in 1682, and then reenacted in
1700, to provide an opportunity for religious services either in the home or at religious
meetings. Id. In its most recent incarnation, enacted in 1939, Pennsylvania's Sunday statute
still contained a hint of these earlier religious purposes, describing Sunday as the Lord's
day." Id. at 594.
"6 McGinley, 366 U.S. at 596 (quoting Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 323 (1848)).
117 Id.
118 See id. at 596, 598 (quoting Specht, 8 Pa. at 323).
119 366 U.S. at 617.
120 See id. at 618-19.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 619-20, 630. Additionally, the blue laws prevented Orthodox Jewish custom-
ers from purchasing kosher food from Friday afternoon until Monday as a result of the
statute's restrictions and the customers' own religious observances. Id. at 630-31.
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overtones were particularly strong in this instance. 123
 By 1782, how-
ever, a statute concerning the "Observance of the Lord's Day" already
stated that the reasons for such restrictions included the chance to
rest from work. 124
 The blue laws were changing so that their purpose
was no longer solely the promotion of religion. 123
In examining the present state of the law in Massachusetts, the
Court found that the current blue laws had been divorced from the
religious motivations of their earlier versions. 120 Although the laws still
contained some religious language, such as references to the "Lord's
Day," "[lit would seem that the objectionable language is merely a
relic."'" The modern purpose of the blue laws was to promote rest
and health, not religion. 128
 This finding, along with statements by the
Massachusetts legislature and Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, was enough to show that the Massachusetts blue laws had nei-
ther a religious purpose nor effect. 129
 Thus, for Sunday blue laws, the
reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court seems clear—the justifications
for upholding a law can evolve over time. 130
123 Id. at 624-25. In 1650, Plymouth Colony had enacted a ban on work on Sundays
and prescribed fines or whipping to punish violators. Id. at 624. In 1671, the religious mo-
tivation for this prohibition was reaffirmed, and the death penalty was made available to
punish the worst transgressors:
Do therefore Order, That whosoever shall Prophane the Lord's-day, by doing
unnecessary servile Work, by unnecessary travailing, or by sports and recrea-
tions, he or they that so transgress, shall forfeit for every such default forty
shillings, or be publickly whipt: But if it clearly appear that the sin was
proudly, Presumptuously and with a high hand committed, against the known
Command and Authority of the blessed God, such a person therein Despising
and Reproaching the Lord, shall be put to death or grievously punished at
the Judgement of the Court.
THE BOOK OF Tut: GENERAL LAWS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE JURISDICTION OF NEW PLI-
MOUTH (Samuel Green ed., Cambridge 1672), reprinted in THE COMPACT WITH THE CIIAR-
TER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH (William Brigham ed., Boston, Dutton
& Wentworth 1836), and in 7 HISTORICAL. WRITINGS IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 247 (R.H.
Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams, Jr. eds., William S. Hein & Co. 1986) (1672), quoted in
Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 625. The laws of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were essentially the
same, beginning with a 1653 ban on drinking and engaging in sports on Sundays. Galla-
gher, 366 U.S. at 625 (citing THE COLONIAL LAWS or MAss. 132-33 (reprinted 1887)).
124 Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 626 (quoting ACTS AND LAWS or THE CONIMONWEAL'Ill OF
IslAss. ch. 23, at 63 (reprinted 1890)).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 626-27.
128 Id. at 627-28 (quoting LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT RELATIVE TO LE
GAL HOLIDAYS AND THEIR OBSERVANCE, S. 525, at 24 (Mass. 1960)).
129 Gallagher; 366 U.S. at 627-28,630.
13° McGowan, 366 U.S. at 434-35.
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III. WHAT THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS MEANS
TO AMERICANS TODAY
A. An Overview of Slate Constitutions
A review of state constitutions demonstrates that the majority of
U.S. states currently grant an individual the right to keep and bear
arms." 1 Most of these states have listed their reasons for doing so, and
although maintaining a militia may be included, there are other
justifications as well.'" Many of these provisions are relatively recent,
and since 1978, twelve states have amended or added provisions
granting the right to bear arms.'" In each case, the state either
strengthened the individual right to bear arms or preserved an al-
ready existing individual right to bear arms.ts't
The state constitutions divide into four groups." 5 First, there are
those states that do not acknowledge a right to keep and bear arms at
a11. 13° Second are the states with provisions concerning arms that are
either similar to that in the U.S. Constitution or are tied explicitly to
the common defense."7 Third, the largest group, are those states
"'ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONS'''. art. 1, § 19; Alt11. CONST. art. 2, § 26; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 15; DEL. CONST, art, I. § 20; FLA. CONST. art, 1,
§ 8; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, VIII; limn() CONST. art, I, § 11; ILL. CONS'I'. all. 1, § 22; IND.
CONST. art. 1, § 32; KAN. CONST. B. of R., § 4; Ky. CONST. § 1; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ME.
CONST. art. 1, § 16; "dim. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 23; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H.
CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. H, § 6; N.D. CoNs .r. art. I, § 1; Oulu CONST. art. I,
§ OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26; OR. CONST. alt. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21; R.I. CONST.
art. 1. § 22; S.D. CoNsT, art. VI, § 24; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONS'''. art. I, § 6; VT.
CoNs -r. ch . 1, art. XVI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; Wis. CONST,
art. 1, § 25; Wvo. CONST, art. 1, § 24.
132 See, e.g., Mo. CoNs .r, art. 1, § 23 (citing the defense of (tome, person, and property);
Wis. CoNsT, art. 1, § 25 (listing security, defense, hunting, and recreation).
133 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; DEL.. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; !twin ,
CONST, art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 16; NEB. CoNs . r. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
N.H. CoNsT. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, § I; W. VA. CoNsT.
art. III, § 22; Wis. CoNsT. art. 1, § 25,
134 ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 19; DEL. CoNs'r. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; InAno
CoNs-r. art. I, § 11; ME. CONS'E. art, 1, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
N.H. CONST. pt . 1, art, 2-a; N.M. CONS'r. art. II, § 6; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § I; W. VA. CoNs .r.
art. III, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 25. Even states which chose to regulate the right to bear
arms further, like Florida, left the individual right to bear arms itself intact. See, e.g., FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 8.
135 See infra notes 140-184 and accompanying text.
196 See infra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 144-154 and accompanying text.
920	 Boston College Law Review
	 {Vol. 45:905
granting what is clearly an individual right to keep and bear arms."$
Fourth, the last group consists solely of Minnesota, which does not
have a constitutional provision concerning the right to bear arms, but
does have a provision that may confer such a right indirectly for lim-
ited purposes. 139
1. States Not Recognizing Any Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Only four states, Iowa, Maryland, New jersey, and California,
have no reference in their constitutions to any sort of a right to bear
arms."° California's constitution is representative of the others in this
regard.I"l It does not list any right to possess arms in its constitutional
list of inalienable rights."2
 Although states may allow their citizens to
keep and bear arms, there is apparently no right to do so under these
states' constitutions.t 43
2. States with Amendments Similar to the Second Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution
States with amendments that are the same or similar to the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution make up a larger group, consist-
ing of Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.'" Of these eight, Hawaii, New
York, North Carolina, and South Carolina essentially repeat the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." 5
 All four begin their provisions
on bearing arms with "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
"8 See infra notes 155-180 and accompanying text.
I59
 See MINN. CONST. art. X111, § 12; infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
140 See CAL. CONST.; IOWA CONST.: MD. CONST.; N J. CONST.
141 See CAL. CoNs-r. art. 1, § 1.
142 See id.
' 45 See CAL. CONST.; IOWA CONST,; Mn. CONST.; N.J. CONS'I'. For example, New Jersey
does not address bearing arms in its constitution, but it does have a statute listing those
citizens explicitly forbidden from owning firearms, implying that it may be legal for others
to own them. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-7 (West 1995). Iowa's constitution, in article 1, sec-
tion 1, lists defending life and liberty among the inalienable rights it protects, but does not
specifically mention bearing arms to do so. See IowA CoNs -r. art. 1, § 1.
144
 ARK. CONST, art. 2, § 5; HAW. CoNs . r. art. 1, § 17; MASS. CONST. pt . 1, art. XVII; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 30; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; 'INN. CONST. art. I, § 24; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13;
N.Y. CM RIGIVIS LAW § 4 (McKinney 1992) (providing a statutory, rather than constitu-
tional, provision for the right to bear arms in New York).
145
 HAW, CONST, art. 1, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. I. § 30; S.C. CoNs.r. art. 1, § 20; N.Y. CR%
RiGiurs LAw § 4.
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shall not be infringed." 146 Although some of these provisions could be
read to support an individual right to bear arms, they are just as am-
biguous as the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) 47
Arkansas and Massachusetts state explicitly that the people have
the right to bear arms for the "common defense," but they do not list
ally other purpose)" Virginia's provision is much less clear because
although it grants the right. to be armed to the militia, it states that.
the militia is made up of the body of the people)" It is possible to
read this as meaning that all citizens, as potential members of the mi-
litia, have the right to be armed)" Nevertheless, because Virginia's
constitution also could be read to allow the right to be armed solely
for the common defense, Virginia remains in this category.m
Kansas's constitutional provision grants the people "the right to
bear arms for their defense and security." 152 The Kansas Supreme
Court has determined, however,. that this provision only grants a col-
lective right for the people to be armed) 53 This interpretation is simi-
lar to that used by Massachusetts courts, so Kansas fits best in this
category as well."4
3. States with Amendments that Provide an Individual Right to Keep
and Bear Arms
Thirty-six states allow an individual the right to bear arms, by far
the largest of the four groups) 55 Within this category, state constitu-
146 HAW. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17; N.C. COWL art. I, § 30; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.Y. Ctv.
RIGHTS LAW § 4. Hawaii and New York's provisions contain nothing more, but North Caro-
lina and South Carolina's provisions go on to describe limits on the military power of the
state. Haw. CoNsr. art. 1, § 17; N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 30; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 20; N.Y. CIV.
RIOI ITS LAW § 4.
147 Levinson, SUM note 1, at 643-44 (stating that "[silo one has ever described the
Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the Second Amendment is perhaps one of the worst
drafted of all its provisions").
Ha ARR. CONST. art. 2, § 5; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts has ruled that the Massachusetts Constitution does not convey any indi-
vidual right to possess arms. Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Mass. 1976).
149 See VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
355 See Levinson, supra note 1, at 646-47.
351 See Lasson, supra note 7, at 167-68 (viewing any reference to the militia to mean
that a provision is solely to provide for an organized military force and conveys no right for
individuals to possess arms).
352 KAN, CoNts .r. B. of R., § 4.
'55 Scejnoction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Km. 1975).
354 Sec id.; Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 849.
199
	
CONST, art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST, art. 2, § 26; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST, art. 1, § 15; DEL. CONST. att. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1,
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Lions grant an individual right to bear arms for varying reasons and
with varying degrees of specificity. 156 Regardless of the differences in
their wording, however, it is clear that the right to bear arms is being
granted to the individual and is not created merely for the sake of a
militia.'" These states divide into five main subgroups. 158
The first subgroup, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, and Rhode Island,
all have state constitutional provisions giving the right to bear arms to
"the people." 159 Each of these provisions is similar to Rhode Island's
provision, which states simply that "Mhe right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed" without giving the reasons behind
this right. 160
 Unlike .the U.S. Constitution, however, these states make no
inention of a militia in granting this right, 161 Although undoubtedly
conveying an individual right to bear arms, these states do not specify
any reasons that may have evolved over time to justify this conveyance. 162
The next subgroup, Alaska, Illinois, and Maine, are more explicit
in granting the right to bear arms to individuals. 165 Alaska's constitu-
tional provision is similar to the others in stating that "[t] he individual
right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the
Stale or a political subdivision of the State."'" Although providing ex-
§ 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, I VIII; (nano CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22; IND.
CONST. art. 1, § 32; Ky. CONST. § I; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ME. CONST, art. 1, § 16; Mimi.
CONST. art. I, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. 2,
§ 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H. CoNsT. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST, art. I, § 1; 0E110 CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONS'r. art. 2, § 26; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONS'''. art. I, § 21; R.I. CoNstr. art. 1, § 22; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CoNsT, art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. Ch. I, art. XVI; WASH. CONST.
art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CoNs•r. art. III, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 25; Wvo. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
156 Compare R.I. CoNs'r. art. 1, § 22 (stating that the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed"), with DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (granting citizens the right
to be armed to defend themselves, their homes, and their property and to hunt).
157 See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21. Pennsylvania's constitution grants citizens the right to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state, which the Pennsylvania Superior Court
has interpreted as conveying an individual right to bear arms. Id.; Commonwealth v. Ray,
272 A.2d 275, 278-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970), vacated, 292 A.2d 410 (Pa. 1972) (vacating on
grounds that Commonwealth's appeal should have been quashed in the first place).
1" Sec infra notes 159-180 and accompanying text.
159 GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, l VIII; liAlto CONST. art. I. § 11; L.A. CONST. art. 1, § 11; R.I.
CONST. art. 1, § 22.
160 Sec R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
161
 See, e.g., id.
162
 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 735 So. 2d 62, 70 (La. Ct. App. 1999). In 1999, in State n.
Williams, the Louisiana Court of Appeal provided no explanation specifying the reason for
a right to bear arms following its statement that -both the United States and the Louisiana
constitutions provide for the right of a citizen to possess arms." See id.
165 SCC ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22; ME,. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
1 " See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.
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plicit examples of how many states recognize an individual right to bear
arms, these states also do not rationalize why they grant this right.t 65
The third subgroup consists of states granting an individual the
right to bear arms to defend both self and state: Alabama, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. 166
Some states, such as Alabama and Connecticut, have provisions giving
"every citizen" the right to bear arms. 167 Others phrase their provi-
sions similarly to that in Florida's constitution, which begins with
"[t] he right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the lawful authority of the state." 168 Because each of
these provisions differentiate between the people and the state, it
would be difficult to argue that they grant only a collective right to
participate in the common defense. 169 More importantly, these states
give a reason for this right, self-protection, distinctly separate from
maintaining a militia.'"
16' Ser ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22; M. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
166 ALA. CONS'S'. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 26; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; FLA.
CONS'''. art. 1, § 8; INn. CONST. art. 1, § 32; Ky. CONST. § MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; On.
CONS'I'. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. 1 . § 21; S.D. CONST. ad . VI, § 24; TEx. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 23; VT. CONST. ch . I, art. XVI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; Wvo. CONST, art. 1, § 24.
' 87 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; CONN. CONST, art. I , § 15.
166 See, e.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
169 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21; Vt'. CONST. Cll. I, art. XVI. For example, Vermont's
provision grants the right to be armed to "the people" to defend themselves and the state,
which the Vermont Supreme Court has interpreted to convey an individual right to possess
arms. VT. CONST. di. 1, art. XVI; sec State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 610-11 (Vt. 1903). In
1970, in Commonwealth v. Ray, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that "kJ he right of
citizens of Pennsylvania to bear arms in defense of themselves; their property and the Slate
predates any Constitution of the Commonwealth, and has been embodied in every Consti-
tution we have had and is in Article I, § 1, and Article I, § 21 of the present Constitution of
Pennsylvania." 272 A.2d at 278-79. The Oregon Supreme Court has found that the phrase
Id] efense of themselves" includes "an individual's right to bear arms to protect both his
person and home" and that the word "arms" referred to in Oregon's constitution means
"hand-carried weapons commonly used by individuals for personal defense." State v. Kess-
ler, 614 P.2d 94, 98, 100 (Or. 1980).
17° See, e.g., Rabbit( v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 491 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). In 1979, in
Rabbit, v. Leonard, the Connecticut Superior Court ruled as follows:
The use of the conjunction "and" gives every citizen a dual right; he has the
right to bear arms to defend the state, a clear reference to the militia; and he
may also bear arms to defend himself. It appears that a Connecticut citizen,
under the language of the Connecticut constitution, has a fundamental right
to bear arms in self-defense, a liberty interest which must be protected by
procedural due process.
Id.
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Ohio also falls within this category."' The Ohio constitutional
provision is different from those described above, granting "people
the right to bear arms for their defense and security." 172
 The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, has interpreted this provision as granting
individual citizens a right of self-defense, allowing a citizen to keep
and bear arms.'"
The fourth subgroup, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Utah, all have constitutions granting
individuals the right to be armed to defend home, person, and prop-
erty.' 74
 Montana's constitutional provision is representative of this
group, stating that "[t] he right of any person to keep or bear arms in
defense of his own home, person, and property, or in the aid of the
civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called into
question."'" The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted this provi-
sion literally to grant a person "the right to keep and bear arms and to
use same in defense of his own home, his person and property."'"
Such language adds two more reasons for an individual right to bear
arms besides self-defense: the defense of home and property. 177
Finally, seven states grant an individual right to bear arms for the
defense of home, person, and property as well as for hunting—Dela-
ware, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.'" Delaware's provision that "[a] person has the right
to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State,
and for hunting and recreational use" is similar to the others.'" These
provisions list all four of the reasons that have been advanced by the
states for granting an individual right to bear arms—defense of self,
home, and property and hunting.m
171 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
172 See OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
173 See, e.g., Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993). According to
the Ohio Supreme Court, in 1993, in Arnold u City of Cleveland, 'The right of defense of
self, property and family is a fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty." Id.
174 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; MISS. CoNST. art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 23; MONT.
CONST. art. 2, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a; OKLA. CoNST. art. 2, § 26; UTAH CONST.
art. 1, § 6.
173 See, e.g., NIONT. CONST. art. 2, § 12.
176 State v. Nickerson, 247 P.2d 188, 192 (Mont. 1952).
177 MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 12.
' 73
 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. CONST, art. I, § 1; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 6; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
179 See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
18° See, e.g., id.
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4. Minnesota: An Indirect Individual Right. to Bear Arms?
Minnesota's constitution does not contain any explicit language
granting its citizens the right to keep and bear arms. 181 Nevertheless,
article XIII, section 12 provides that "Nunting and fishing and the
taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be
forever preserved for the people." 182 Prior to the enactment of this
provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court had mentioned the possibil-
ity of a common law right to bear arms, but did not rule explicitly that
one existed."3 There are no rulings on what effect article XIII, sec-
tion 12 would have on such a common law right if it were recognized
explicitly. 1 E54
13. Reasons Articulated by State Courts for an Individual Right to Bear Arms
1. Self-Defense
In interpreting their state constitutions, many state courts have
found self-defense to be one of the most vital reasons for upholding
an individual right to possess arms) 85 The right to defend one's self
also has been held to protect the means to do so, allowing citizens to
keep and bear arms."6 This right has even been found, in some cir-
cumstances, to overcome a charge of violating a ban on concealed
weapons. 187
a. State v. Hatndan: The Right to Bear Arms and Bans on Concealed
Weapons
In 2003, in Stale v. Hamdan, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dis-
cussed the right of self-defense and its relation to the state's 1998 con-
stitutional amendment granting the right to bear arms for "security;
defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."I 88 The is-
sue in that case was the constitutionality of a store owner's conviction
181 Sec MINN. CONST.
182 Id. art. XIII, § 12.
188 In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. 1980).
184 Although there are cases on other situations this provision may affect, such as boat
inspections, there are no reported cases concerning its impact on a right to bear arms. Sec
State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003).
185 See, e.g., Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169; State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Wis. 2003).
188 State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 99 (Or. 1980).
187 Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d nt 804-05.
188 ‘Vis. CONST. art. I, § 25; Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 790.
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for carrying a concealed weapon in his place of business.'" The court
found it reasonable for the store owner to keep a concealed handgun
in the store to protect himself, his family, his customers, and his prop-
erty.'" The right to bear arms for the purpose of security in one's
place of business provided a constitutional defense for violating the
state's concealed weapons ban.' 91
To arrive at this conclusion, the court weighed the public
benefits of the concealed weapons law against the benefits of allowing
individuals to keep and bear arms. 192 The concealed weapons ban was
held to be a legitimate use of the police power with a reasonable
justification.'" The ban prevented people from accessing weapons
that they might use in a flash of anger or in response to fear.'" Addi-
tionally, requiring weapons to be worn openly put the public on no-
tice that it was dealing with someone who had a dangerous weapon.' 95
This permitted people, including the police, to act accordingly.'"
These justifications, however, did not override the rights of store
owners to keep and bear arms.' 97 Such people are less likely to act on
impulse in their own businesses where the highest priority is the safety
of their customers. 198 Store owners certainly are not likely to use con-
cealed weapons to commit crimes in their own establishments.'"
The court identified two locations where the crime of possessing
a firearm is mitigated—a person's home and place of business. 2" In
either place, which a person may own and spend most of his or her
time, the purposes justifying a ban on concealed weapons are less
compelling than otherwise."' In these situations, a person has a sub-
stantial interest in exercising a right to be armed by carrying a con-
cealed weapon. 202
Furthermore, the court noted that many states have recognized a
special connection between the right to bear arms and the protection
' 89 Harridan, 665 N.‘17.2d at 789-90.
' 9° Id. at 790.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 800.
199 Id. at 803.
194
 Harridan, 665 N.W.2d at 803-04.





 Harndalt, 665 N,W.2d at 804.
09 Id.
201 Id.
292 Id. at 804,811-12.
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of property. 205 In Wisconsin, for example, the right to bear arms in
protecting property is implied by the state constitution's reference to
"security."2°4 This does not refer to any imminent threat, but instead,
means the preservation of a state of peace, most strongly associated
with a person's home and oilier places where a person has a posses-
sory interest. 2"
In these places, a person is not likely to depend on police protec-
tion, but rather is likely to provide his or her own security.206 The
court warned that "[i]ii fact, a person who takes no initiative to pro-
vide security in these private places is essentially leaving security to
chance."207 The right of a person to bear arms in the interest of pro-
viding security is at its apex when exercised in the person's home or
business. 208 Consequently, the court in Hamdan found the store
owner's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon unconstitutional
because he was in his place of business, had a weapon for the lawful
purpose of providing security; and needed to keep the weapon con-
cealed for practical reasons. 2"
b. State v. Kessler: Protecting the Weapons Needed for Self:Defense
In 1980, in State v. Kessler; the Oregon Supreme Court came to es-
sentially the same conclusion as the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ham-
dan, ruling that. Oregon's constitution allowed for the possession of a
dangerous weapon in the home for the defense of persons and prop-
erty. 21 ° Although the case involved the possession of a billy club (which
state law prohibited) and not a firearm, the decision was based on the
recognition of the right of self-defense. 211 Oregon law could prohibit
carrying dangerous weapons in public, but the state constitution pro-
tected the keeping of arms within a person's home to repel intruders.02
gas
	 at 805. One of the court's examples was Oklahoma, where it was held that a citi-
zen has the common law right to possess a concealed weapon in the citizen's own home.
Id. (citing Gilio v. State, 33 P.3d 937, 941 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)).
201
	 665 N.W.2d at 806 (citing WIS. CONS'''. art. 1, § 25).





	 665 N.W.2d at 811-12. The court also found that it was unreasonable to
require a store owner to carry a weapon openly when in the place of business. Id. at 809.
Such a requirement would both alert criminals to the presence of the weapon and possibly
scare customers. Id.
210 hcssler, 614 P.2d at 100; see Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 804, 811-12.
211 Sec Kessler 614 P.2d at 100.
212 Id. (Citing OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; OR. REv. S•AT. § 166.510 (repealed 1985)).
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In examining the issue, the court noted a long tradition in the
United States of allowing citizens to bear arms for the protection of
self and property.213
 Additionally, the privilege of self-defense had been
recognized since the fifteenth century in England and from the be-
ginning of the United States. 2 " In granting this right of self-defense to
individuals, the court interpreted the state constitution to also protect
the possession of weapons that could be used for personal protec-
tion. 215
 The defendant's billy club fell within this protected category. 21 °
c. Arnold v. City of Cleveland: The Right to Bear Arms Cannot Be
Destroyed by Regulation.
More recently, in 1993, in Arnold v. City of Cleveland, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained how self-defense was a significant right in
that state as wel1. 217
 Although it upheld a municipal ban on assault
weapons, the court pointed out that Ohio's constitution "secures to
every person a fundamental individual right to bear arms for 'their
defense and security. "218
 The state constitution unquestionably had
been written to allow citizens to possess firearms for defense of self
and property. 219
 The court assumed that there had been no debate
about the provision to bear arms when the constitution was revised in
1802 and 1851 because the right was so widely recognized and un-
controversia1. 220
 Like the Oregon Supreme Court in Kessler; the
Arnold court held that the right of self-defense has always existed in
the United States.221
213 1d. at 98.
214 Id. The court noted the following:
"The privilege of self-defense rests upon the necessity of permitting a man
who is attacked to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to himself, where
there is no time to resort to the law. The early English law, with its views of
strict liability, did not recognize such a privilege .... But since about 1400 the
privilege has been recognized, and it is now undisputed, in the law of torts as
well as in the criminal law."
Id. at 98 n.13. (quoting WILLIAM L. PRossER, LAW or TORTS 108 (4th ed. 1971) (citations
omitted)).
213 Id. at 99.
216
 Kessler, 614 P.2d at 100.
217 616 N.E.2d at 169.
218 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Onto Coml.. art. I, § 4 and citing State v. Ho-




 See Arnold 616 N.E.2d at 169; see also Kessler, 614 P.2d at 98.
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To describe the importance of citizens being able to keep and
bear firearms today, the Arnold court wrote the following:
To deprive our citizens of the right to possess any firearm
would thwart the right that was so thoughtfully granted by
our forefathers and the drafters of our Constitution. For
many, the mere possession of a firearm in the home offers a
source of security. Furthermore, given the history of our na-
tion and this state, the right of a person to possess certain
firearms has indeed been a symbol of freedom.222
The court upheld the ban on assault weapons, but ruled that an at-
tempt to ban all firearms would have violated the state constitution. 223
d. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc.: The Importance of Self-Defense in. State Policy
Although not specifically dealing with firearms, in 2001, in Feliciano
r 7-Eleven, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that. West. Vir-
ginia also attaches great importance to the right of self-defense. 224 The
plaintiff, a 7-Eleven employee, had been fired for violating store policy
when Ile disarmed and subdued a robber, instead of complying with
her demands as store policy dictated. 229 The plaintiff then filed a civil
claim that he had been wrongfully discharged for exercising his right to
defend himself. 228 The court held that self-defense was a "substantial
public policy exception" to the state's doctrine of at-will employment
and could serve as the basis for a claim of wrongful discharge. 227
In determining the value of the right of self-defense, the court
looked, in part., to the state constitution and determined that state ju-
dicial history "clearly demonstrates the existence of a public policy fa-
voring an individual's right to defend" himself or herself. 228 From the
time of West Virginia's earliest reported cases, the right of self-defense
against an unprovoked attack had been continually recognized and
preserved. 229 The court then reviewed more than a dozen cases sup-
222 616 N.E.2d at 169-70.
228 1d. at 173.
224 See 559 S.E.2d 713,722-23 (W. Va. 2001).
228 Id. at 716.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 724.
228 Id. at 719. The West Virginia Constitution provides that "[a] person has the right to
keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting
and recreational use," W. VA. CoNs'r. art. III, § 22.
229 Fcliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 719.
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porting that position, including several cases holding that when a
person's life is in danger, that person may use a deadly weapon in
self-defense. 2" The court also found that the right to defend one's
self, family, or property was not limited solely to the home. 23 i A per-
son might also stand his or her ground and defend his or her place of
business, rather than be forced to retreat by an assailant. 232 In the
plaintiff's case, there was a substantial public policy allowing him to
exercise his right of self-defense, and to be fired for doing so sup-
ported a claim of wrongful discharge. 233
e. People v. Buckmire: Recognizing a Need to Bear Arms for Self-Defense,
Absent a Constitutional Provision
A state that does not have a constitutional provision granting any
right to bear arms still may recognize the importance of self-defense. 234
In 1995,  in People v. Buckmire, for example, the Supreme Court for New
York County, New York, took into account the state legislature's recog-
nition of a right of self-defense in deciding whether a defendant who
had carried a loaded gun to work had violated a state statute. 235 The
relevant statute provided that a person was guilty of criminal possession
of a weapon if the person carried any loaded firearms. 235 There was,
however, an exception to the statute—if a loaded firearm was possessed
in either a person's home or place of business, there was no viola-
tion.237 These exceptions showed that the legislature had decided that
the crime of firearm possession was mitigated in the two places where a
law-abiding citizen spent the most time and expected the most personal
security.238 As a result,. the defendant had not violated the statute by
bringing a loaded gun to the office building where he was employed. 239
23° Id. at 719-22 (quoting State v. Hamrick, 81 S.E. 703, 705 (W. Va. 1914)).
231 Id. at 722.
232 Id.
235 Id. at 723-24.
234 See People v. Buckmire, 638 N.YS.2d 883, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1995). New York has a stat-
ute concerning the right to bear arms, but it does not have a constitutional provision. Sec
N.Y. CTN.,. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 1992); sec also supra note 144.
233 Id.
258 Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 2000)).
237 Id.
238 See id. at 885.
"9 Buckmire, 638 N.Y.S.2c1 at 886.
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2. Protection of Property
Many states have stressed self-defense to justify the bearing of
arms by individual citizens, but in 1952, in Slate v. Nickerson, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court explicitly ruled that arms may be used lawfully to
defend property as wel1. 240 In Nickerson, the court had to decide
whether the defendant had cominittecl assault when he pointed a pis-
tol at a man who had come onto his property uninvited. 241 The in-
truder had entered the defendant's property in defense of a squatter
who had taken over the defendant's dwelling in his absetice. 242 To de-
cide whether the defendant had committed assault in confronting the
intruder, the court examined the state constitution, which provided
that a person could bear arms in "defense of his own home, person
and property."243 In explaining the importance of defending home
and property, the court stated the following:
If a man may not lawfully defend his property, his home, by
the use of whatever force it is necessary to use under the cir-
cumstances of the case, then lie is at the mercy of every tramp,
trespasser, or even burglar, who comes along, and enters and
takes possession, during his temporary absence therefrom. 244
The use of force was allowed to prevent a trespass or an interference
with personal property. 245 The court held that use of a weapon was
unlawful only if it was unnecessary. 246 Here, the defendant's use of
force was reasonable because he did not injure the intruder and be-
cause had he used less force, he might have put himself at risk of in-
jury or loss of property. 247 Because neither the intruder, nor his squat-
ter friend, had any right or authority to enter the defendant's prop-
erty, the defendant had not committed assault by pointing a pistol at
the intruder. 248
246 247 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1952).
241 Id, at 188.
242 Id. at 189-92.
245 Id. at 192 (citing MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. 3, § 13).
244 Id. at 193 (quoting State v. Howell, 53 P. 314, 315 (Mont. 1898)).
246 Nickerson, 247 P.2d at 192.
246 Id. at 193 (quoting Dinan v. Gibbon, 63 Cal. 387 (1883)).
247 Id. (quoting State v. Yancey, 74 N.C. 244 (1876)).
248 Id,
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C. The Structure of American Tort Law and Allowing Citizens to Possess the
Means to Defend Themselves
Self-defense becomes an even stronger reason for upholding an
individual's right to bear arms in light of the doctrine that, in general,
the police have no ditty to protect individuals. 243 Absent a specific of-
fer of police protection, individual citizens are expected to provide
their own security. 250 The assumption is that citizens actually have the
means with which to protect themselves. 251
In 1855, in South v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court set out one
of the earliest decisions expounding this rule. 252 A man had been at-
tacked by a mob and imprisoned by them for four days, after which he
paid his assailants $2500 to be set free. 253 The victim then tried to
bring a claim against the sheriff for failure to protect, because the
sheriff had been present when the victim was attacked, but did noth-
ing to stop the mob. 254
Even after noting that the victim had suffered great injury as a
result, the Court refused to find the sheriff liable for any negli-
gence.255 Any duty the sheriff had in his role as keeper of the peace
was to the public.255 As a result, any neglect of that duty was punish-
able only by an indictment, not by private action. 257
Federal courts still adhere to the precedent set out in South, 258 In
2003, in Hernandez v. City of Goshen, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the position that failure by the police to protect some-
245 Sec Kirk v. City of Shawnee, 10 P.3d 27, 30 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). The court ex-
plained the "public duty doctrine' as follows:
Under this doctrine, the fact the governmental entity owes a legal duty to the
public at large does not establish a basis for an individual to claim the agency
owed a legal duty to him or her personally. No duty exists unless the plaintiff
establishes that the agency owed a special duty to the injured party.
Id. (citation omitted).
25° See Dore v. City of Fairbanks, 31 P.3c1 788, 794 (Alaska 2001).
251 Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737 N.1:S.2d 412, 414-15 (App. Div. 2002) (stating
that an offer of police protection must reasonably induce the private party to forgo other
means of protection).
252 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403 (1855).
253
 Id. at 401.
254 Id,
255
 Id. at 403.
250 Id.
257 South, 59 U.S. at 403.
258 See Hernandez v. City of Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2003); sec also South, 59
U.S. at 403.
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one did not create a constitutional claim.259 In that case, a mill em-
ployee, who got into a fight with another worker, left the mill threat-
ening to come back and to injure others.26° The mill manager called
the police to report this threat and told them that he was worried
about the safety of his employees. 26 I The police replied that. they
would not do anything unless someone was actually harmed. 262 Later
that day the disgruntled worker returned to the mill where he shot
and killed the manager and wounded several employees. 263 The court
held that "police departments have no duty to protect private persons
from injuring each other, at least where the police department has
not itself created the danger. "264 Even when the police are aware of a
danger to someone and fail to act, there is no liability on their part. 265
State courts have followed suit, consistently denying claims
brought by injured citizens against the police for failing to protect
them. 266 Many courts follow the view in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
that one person does not owe any duty to protect another from any
foreseeable harm caused by a third party 267 There are two exceptions
to this rule. 268 The first exception is if a special relationship exists be-
tween the actor (the police) and the third party who is anticipated to
injure someone, then the police do have a duty to prevent that in-
jury. 269 This special relationship would exist. if the police had taken
the third party into custody and knew or should have known that he
or she was likely to injure someone if not kept under contro1. 27° The
other exception is if a special relationship exists between the party
who is concerned about his or her safety and the police. 271 If the po-
296 Hernandez, 324 F.3d at 539.
200 Id. at 536.
261 Id.
262 Id.
= 69 Id. The worker who shot the manager and other employees also died during the in-
cident, but the opinion does not specify if it was by his own hand or as a result of police
action. Id.
264 Hernandez, 324 F.3d at 538.
265 Id. at 539.
266 See, e.g., Dorn 31 P.3d at 796; Robertson V. City of Topeka 644 P.2d 458, 463 (Kan.
1982).
267 Dore, 31 P.3d at 793 n.33 (quoting RcsTivrEttENT (SmoNn) or Towns § 314 (1965)
(providing that "[t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action")).
266 m
969 Id. at 793.
270 Id. at 793-94.
271 Id. at 794.
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lice took this person into protective custody or made some assurance
that the person could rely on them for protection, then this would
establish such a special relationship.272
An example of a state court using these principles can be found
in Dore v. City of Fairbanks, where, in 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court
found the police not guilty of failure to protect a wife from her hus-
band.278
 Because the police did not act on a warrant to arrest the hus-
band, he was able to kill his wife and then commit suicide. 274
 With no
special relationship between the police and either the victim or the
killer, there was no negligence on the part of the police for failing to
act. 278 Also in 2001, in Robertson v. City of Topeka, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the absence of a special relationship between the
plaintiff and the police meant he could not recover for. damage to his
property caused by a trespasser that the police refused to remove. 276
In 2002, in Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department of New York, used the same lack of a spe-
cial relationship to find the police not guilty of negligence for failing
to protect the plaintiff. 277
 The plaintiff's estranged husband had
stabbed her after a series of incidents involving the police and after
officers had assured her that they would look out for her. 278
In the three cases above, there is a common theme that a special
relationship between the victim and the police is one in which the
victim would have relied completely on the police instead of taking
steps to protect himself or herself. 279
 The Clark court, for example,
wrote that a special relationship would exist when the police made a
voluntary offer to protect the plaintiff in such a way that it induced
her to relax her guard and to forgo other methods of protecting her-
self. 288
 Unless the plaintiff actually had the right and the means to de-
fend herself, this would have left her completely unprotected. 281
272 Dore, 31 P.3d at 794; Cloth, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414-15.
2 73 31 P.3d at 789.
27' Id, at 789-90.
275 See id. at 794-96.
276
 644 P.2d at 463. The plaintiff had called the police to his home to remove a tres-
passer, saying that the intruder would likely burn his house down. Id. at 460. The police
refused to remove the trespasser and instead told the plaintiff to leave the premises. Id.
The house began burning fifteen minutes later. Id.
277 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414-16.
275 Id. at 414.
:73 See Dore, 31 P.3d at 794; Robertson, 644 P.2d at 463; Clot*, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
2t0 737 N.YS.2d at 415.
281
 Id. The court seems to assume that other means of protection were available. See id.
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IV. RECOGNIZING AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DOES NOT
MEAN SURRENDERING TO LAWLESSNESS
Even courts that recognize that an individual has the right to bear
arms have maintained that this right is not absolute and therefore can
be regulated.282 In 1993, in Arnold v. City of Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme
Court gave a detailed description of the importance of the individual
right to bear arms. 283 The court then went on to state that this right was
not unlimited and was subject to reasonable regulation under the po-
lice power. 284 In fact, the state legislature was required to use the police
power to further public safety, under which the control of firearms cer-
tainly comes.288 The question was not whether the legislature could
regulate firearms, but whether such regulations were reasonable.286
The court held that a ban on assault weapons, which limited the type of
weapons citizens could possess, was reasonable, but a ban on all arms
would have been unconstitutional. 287
In 1990, in State v. Brown, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court ar-
rived at a similar conclusion. 288 Because the 1987 amendment to the
state constitution clearly granted individuals the right to bear arms,
the court had to determine whether this meant a convicted felon
could claim this right. 289 The decision that felons could not bear arms
rested, in part, on the commonsense assumption that the citizens had
never intended the amendment to allow inmates in state prisons or
patients in mental hospitals to possess weapons. 299 Further, following
case law from other states, the court ruled that no right is absolute. 29 '
The question then became whether depriving felons of this right was
reasonable and had a rational relationship to the problem that was of
concern to the state.292 Keeping weapons out of the hands of those
282 See, e.g.. State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816,818 (Me. 1990); Arnold v. City of Cleveland,
616 N.E.2d 163,172-73 (Ohio 1993).
283 616 N.E.2d at 169-70.
284 Id. at 172.
288 Id.
288 Id.
287 Id. at 172-73 (holding that using the police power to ban all arms in the city would
have violated the state constitution's provision granting the right to hear arms).
288 5 71 A.2d at 820.
289 Id. at 816 (citing Mi. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
290 /d. at 818.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 820.
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who already had shown a flagrant disregard for the law, in order to
protect the public, clearly passed the test. 293
In 1986, in State v. McAdams, the Wyoming Supreme Court de-
scribed this balance between the reasonable use of the police power
and the right to bear arms. 294 Although almost all states use the police
power to regulate the possession of arms, that power cannot be in-
voked in such a way that it destroys, rather than restricts, the right to
bear arms.295 A balance must be struck between the individual rights
of the citizen and the state's right to pass statutes that maintain order
in society.290 For the McAdams court, a state ban on concealed weap-
ons did impose sonic limitations on an individual's right to defend
himself.297 It was reasonable, however, when balanced against the goal
of protecting the public from a dangerous weapon that it was unaware
of and that could be used in the heat of passion. 298
V. ANALYSIS: SELF-DEFENSE, HUNTING, AND THE PROTECTION OF
HOME AND PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY AN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS INDEPENDENT OF MAINTAINING A MILITIA
In upholding state blue laws, as in McGowan u Maryland in 1961,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the justifications for a statute may
change over time. 299 Originally, laws restricting citizen activities on
Sundays were created to promote religious observances 3 00 If this pur-
pose had continued to be the main reason justifying the blue laws,
then these statutes probably would have violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."' Gradually, however, state legisla-
tures continued these restrictions for secular purposes, namely pro-
viding a day of rest for workers. 902 The same year, in Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., the Court held that even
when some of the earlier religious language persisted, it was only a
relic of history and no longer controlled the purpose of the statute." 3
299
	
Blown, 571 A.2d at 819-21.
294 714 P.2d 1236,1237-38 (Wyo. 1986).
295
 Id. at 1237.
295 Id.
297 Id. at 1238.
298 Id.
299 366 U.S. 420, 444 (1961).
300 /d. at 431.
301 Id.; see U.S. CONS I, amend. 1.
30 Id. at 444-45.
858 366 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1961).
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The same approach can be used to resolve the question of
whether the Second Amendment should be read to protect an indi-
vidual or a collective right for the people to keep and bear arm s."4
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly wrote the Second
Amendment to allow the people to keep and bear arms.'" Over two
hundred years later, there is still disagreement on the purpose for
granting this right.306 States' right supporters claim that the only pur-
pose was to allow the people to form a militia and to enable the
United States to avoid the need for a standing army. 807 Some now
claim that this need is long gone and that the Second Amendment
should be repealed, as it has outlived its purpose. 3" Individual rights
supporters argue instead that the Second Amendment. was written to
protect the right of individual citizens to keep and bear arms. 809 The
current split among the federal circuit. courts of appeals shows that.
reasonable people can read history to support either view." )
Even if maintaining a militia was the original reason for guaran-
teeing the right of the people to bear arms, other reasons for allowing
citizens to keep and bear arms have evolved over time. 311 These con-
temporary justifications are not for a collective right of the people to
defend themselves as a militia, but instead, they are for an individual
right to bear arms. 312 Evidence of these justifications, most impor-
tantly self-defense, can be seen in reviewing state constitutional provi-
sions and state court decisions concerning the right to bear arms. 313
Because federal legislators have never redrafted the Bill of Rights,
state constitutions are the best source for determining how Americans
and their legislatures define and justify a right to bear arms today. 3"
304 See Lasson, supra note 7, at 156 (stating that the U.S. Constitution must be able to
evolve over time).
3°5 Kates, supra note 1, at 218 (arguing that the word "people" cannot be read to refer
somehow to the states and not to individual citizens).
306 See, e.g., Rates, supra note 1, at 206; Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 515-17: Lev-
inson, supra note 1, at 641; McCoskey, supra note 1, at 873-74; Prince, supra note 1, at 660-
61.
See Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 517-18.
908 Id. at 522.
309 Lasso's, supra note 7, at 161.
310 Sec supra notes 40-81 and accompanying text.
311 Sec supra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., Cow. CoNsr. art. II , § 13: Miss. CONS•''. art. 3, § 12.
313
	 e.g., Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163,169 (Ohio 1993).
314 See supra notes 131-248 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court found
that how a state court interprets and justifies a piece of legislation was persuasive in its
review of the blue laws. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 449-50.
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Thirty-six states currently grant an individual the right to bear
arms, leaving no doubt that this right is valued by many Americans. 315
This is especially true in the case of the twelve states that have recently
added or amended their constitutional provisions concerning die
right to bear arms.315 Each of these states either added a new individ-
ual right to bear arms or left untouched an existing individual right. 517
With this recent activity, it is hard to argue that any reason for an indi-
vidual right to bear arms is an archaic holdover from another era. 315
Reviewing state constitutions shows that for many states the right
to bear arms has become important as a guarantee of self-defense. 319
Of the thirty-six states that have a constitutional provision granting an
individual right to bear arms, twenty-nine of them include some
definition of personal security as a justification. 320 Without an individ-
ual right to bear arms, the ability of citizens to defend themselves
315 See ALA. CONS'''. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 26;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art, 1, § 15; DEL. CONS'''. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 8; GA. CONS'r. art. 1, § 1,1[ VIII; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22;
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 32; Ky. CONST. § 1; L.A. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 16;
MICH. CONS'''. art. I, § 6; Miss. CoNs'r. art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. Corsi.
art. 2, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a;
N.M. CONS'!', art. II, § 6; N.D. CONS'!'. art. I, § 1; Onto CONS'!', art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST.
art. 2, § 26; OR. CONS'r. art, I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21; R.I. CONST, art. 1, § 22; S,D.
CONST. art. VI, § 24; TEX. CONS'''. arc. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONS'''. ch. 1,
art. XVI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CoNs'r. art. III, § 22; Wts. CONST. art. 1, § 25;
WYO. CONST. art, 1, § 24.
518
 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; IDAHO
CONST, art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 16; NEB. CONS'''. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
N.H. CoNsT. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CoNs'r. art. II, § 6; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 22; Wis. CoNsT. art. 1, § 25.
317 See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (amended 1988); Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (added
1998).
518 See Korth Gladston, supra note 1, at 521 (noting that Itihe passage of two centu-
ries has brought wholesale changes in the composition of the well-regulated militia, and in
the role of firearms in American society"). Wisconsin is perhaps the best example of this
recent activity, adding a constitutional provision in 1998 to grant the people the right to
bear arms "for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose." See IV IS.
CONST. art. 1, § 25.
519 See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 2. § 12; N.H. CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a.
320
 ALA. CoNsT. art. I, § 26; Aim. CoNsT. art. 2, § 26; Cow. CONST. art. II. § 13; CONK.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1,
§ 32; Ky. CONS'I'. § 1; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MISS. CONS'''. art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONST. art. 1,
§ 23; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H.
CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONS'I'. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST. art, I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 4; OKI.A. CONST. art. 2, § 26; OR. CONS'''. art. I, § 27; PA. CONS'''. art. 1, § 21; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAII CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch . 1, art. XVI;
WASH. CONS'I'. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CONST, art. HI, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25; Wyo.
CONST. art. 1, § 24.
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against criminals and other threats would be seriously hampered, if
not effectively destroyed. 321 Even New York, with no constitutional
provision concerning a right to bear arms, has recognized the impor-
tance of allowing citizens to possess weapons to defend themselves at
home and at their places of employment. 322
Many state courts have affirmed the importance of the right. of
self-defense."3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has made the practical
observation that citizens who do not take steps to defend themselves
are leaving their security to chance. 324 The logical extension of this
right, as held by the Oregon Supreme Court in Slate v. Kessler, is that.
citizens also must have the means available to defend themselves. 325 It
seems clear that the right to defend oneself, which has existed in the
common law for centuries, is not worth much if individual citizens are
not permitted to keep and bear arms.326
The structure of tort law makes the need for individual citizens to
be able to keep and bear arms even more important. 327 State courts
have followed the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that.
the police do not owe any duty to protect a person unless they have
given assurances that they will protect him or her, 328 These assurances
must be such that it would induce the person to forgo other methods
of protecting himself or herself. 329
As shown by Clark v. Town. of Ticonderoga, this is a high burden
that is not. met by the police simply offering to check up on a citi-
zen. 3  There must be more to the offer of protection to make the
citizen relax his or her guard. 331 The assumption that a person has
other available means of protecting himself or herself meshes with
the importance that state courts have given to the right to bear arms
set See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169-70; State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98, 100 (Or. 1980).
322 People v. Buckmire, 638 N.1:S.2t1 883, 885-86 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
923 See, e.g., Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169-70; State v. Hamdan, 665 N.N.V.2d 785, 790 (Wis.
2003).
324 Herndon, 665 N.W.2d at 807.
325 Sec 614 P.2d at 99.
326 See A rnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169-70.
327 Sec Kirk v. City of Shawnee, 10 P.3d 27, 30 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that the
government does not owe any duty to protect individual citizens).
328 See, e.g., Dore v. City of Fairbanks, 31 P.3d 788, 793 (Alaska 2001); Robertson v. City
of Topeka, 644 P.2d 458, 463 (Kan. 1982).
329 Robertson, 644 P.2d at 462; Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415
(App. Div. 2002).
338 See 737 N.Y.S.2d at 415,
391 Sec id.
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for self-defense."2 If we are not going to hold the police responsible
for failing to protect individual citizens, we should not then take away
the means by which a citizen may protect himself or herself. 9"
Fourteen states also list defense of property as a specific reason
for granting an individual right to bear arms."4 Although the morality
of using firearms to defend property rather than life may be debat-
able, defense of property can be critical to prevent citizens from being
at the mercy of criminals who seek to prey on them.3  As shown in
the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Nickerson, however,
the use of arms in defending property must be limited to where it is
appropriates" This concern about the appropriateness of such use of
firearms is not a reason for denying an individual right to bear arms;
it is instead an example of how the right can be reasonably regulated,
which is within the government's power. 337
The same fourteen states that list defense of property as a
justification for an individual right to bear arms also list defense of the
home as a separate justification. 999
 Many state courts also seem to con-
sider defense of the home a special situation, separate from the defense
of property."9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court. held that defense of the
home is of such importance that a person possessing a concealed
weapon in his or her residence is not violating the state ban on con-
cealed weapons. 94° The Oregon Supreme Court explicitly ruled that
Oregon's constitution protects the possession of dangerous weapons
within the home."' The Ohio Supreme Court noted that for many citi-
zens, the mere possession of a firearm in the home gives them a sense
of security."2
 The ability of individual citizens to possess weapons for
332
 See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169-70; Kessler, 614 P.2d at 98, 100.
333
 See Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169 (citing State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 575 (Ohio 1900)).
3" COLO. CONS•'•. art. II, § 13; Du.. CoNsT, art. I, § 20; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 12; Mo.
CONST. art. 1, § 23; MONT. CONST, art. 2, § 12; NEB. CONS'''. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. GoNsT. art. I, § 1; Data. CONST. art.
2, § 26; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. I1.I , § 22; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
335 State v. Nickerson, 247 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1952).
333 Id. at 192.
337 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 818 (Me. 1990); Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172-73.
338 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; Du,. CONST. art. I, § 20; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 12; Mo.
CoNs .r. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONS'r. art. 2, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § I; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
N.H. CONST. pt . 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art.
2, § 26; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONS'''. art. 1, § 25.
339 See BitthMilr, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 885; Kessler, 614 P.2d at 100; Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d at 804.
340 Haindan, 665 N.W.2d at 804.
3+ 1 Kessler, 614 P.2d at 100.
942 Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 170.
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the defense of their homes and for repelling intruders is certainly a
widely recognized right. 343
In addition to the defense of self, property, and home, seven state
constitutions also list. hunting as a reason for an individual right to bear
arms.344 In both Wisconsin and Maine, protecting citizens' ability to
hunt was a major factor in why these states recently added a specific
individual right to hear arms to their state constitutions. 345 In Minne-
sota, where any right to bear arms is ambiguous, hunting was important.
enough for the population to give it specific constitutional protec-
tion.346 Because even a small, eastern state like Delaware recognizes the
value of hunting to its citizens, it should be seen as a nationally impor-
tant, contemporary justification for an individual right to bear amis."?
States' right proponents may be correct: perhaps there is no
longer a need to allow the people to be armed to form a militia. 3 't 8
Self-defense, defense of the home and property, and the ability to
hunt, however, are compelling reasons for still allowing individual
citizens to keep and bear art-m. 349 They are at least as valid as provid-
ing a day of rest was in upholding the blue laws.35° With these con-
temporary reasons justifying an individual right to be armed, it is
clear that the right. of the people to keep and bear arms in the Second
Amendment now should be read- as an individual right. 351 The Second
Amendment's mention of the militia should be read as merely a relic
of the past and no longer controlling. 352
343 See, e.g., Arnold, 616 N.E.2c1 at 170; Hamdon, 665 N.W.2d at 805.
344 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.M. CONST.
art. H, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
343. See Arms Measure Approved in Maine, ASSOCIATED PRESS Pot.. SEttvicr., Nov. 4, 1987,
1987 WL 2438673 [hereinafter Arms Measure]; Adam S. Marlin, Feingold Backs State Amend-
ment on Guns, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, 1998 WL 14532313. U.S. Congressman Mark
Neumann, who supported the amendment, stated, "My position on gun control is that any
law-abiding citizen should be able to own guns.... I know 1 go deer hunting in the fall,
and I want to be able to own my gun." Marlin, supra. Steve Duren, director of the Sports-
man's Alliance of Maine, which led the push for the amendment, declared that "Mt was a
sportsman-backed issue from the start, and sportsmen carried it." Arms Measure, supra.
346 See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12.
547 See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
343 Korth & Gladston, supra note 1, at 521.
349 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1,
§ 25 (listing the primary reasons for an individual right to bear arms).
33° See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 444-45.
3" See Lasson, supra note 7, at 156 (positing the idea that the U,S. Constitution must
be a flexible, living document).
352 See Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 626-27 (treating the contemporary mention of the "Lord's
Day" in the blue laws as a relic of the past).
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Interpreting the Second Amendment to protect this individual
right to bear arms should not create a fear of totally unrestricted
firearm possession and use. 353 State courts in many of the states that
recognize an individual's right to bear arms have pointed out that this
right, like all others, can be reasonably regulated to protect public
safety. 354 As the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled, the government can
restrict the types of weapons citizens may possess. 355 Additionally, as the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court has held, the state can act to keep
firearms out of the hands of those who pose a threat to the public,
namely convicted felons. 356 What the states may not do, however, is
regulate the right to bear arms to the point that it becomes meaning-
less. 357
CONCLUSION
In the case of the Second Amendment, the normal methods of
statutory interpretation have not yielded a satisfactory result. Neither
the intent of the Framers, nor other historical sources have provided
an answer as to which right the Second Amendment was written to
protect. If the U.S. Supreme Court revisits the issue, which the cur-
rent split among the federal circuit courts of appeals makes likely, the
Court will have to look elsewhere for the answer. Instead of looking to
the past, however, the Court should look to how the right to bear
arms is interpreted in the nation today. It should use again the
method that it employed with the blue laws, deciding if a contempo-
rary reason exists for upholding an older piece of legislation. Apply-
ing this approach to the right to bear arms shows that there are ample
reasons today for upholding that right as an individual one.
ROBERT A. CREAMER
355 See, e.g., Brown, 571 A.2d at 818; Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172-73 (noting that the right
to bear arms can be reasonably regulated).
35A
	
e.g., Brown, 571 A.2d at 818; Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172-73.
355 Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 172-73.
556 Brown, 571 A.2d at 819-21.
357 State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236.1237 (Wyo. 1986).
